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CHILD SUPPORT: THE DOUBLE STANDARD
KAREN COLBY WEINER *
Historically and presently, the purpose of imposing a legal duty
of child support upon a parent has been to ensure that children are
provided for' through private rather than public resources. 2 While
this end is justified, it is often not achieved.' Furthermore, consider-
ing the rapidly changing role of women in our society, the gender-
based double standard frequently employed by courts and legisla-
tures enforcing this duty is questionable. This article examines the
child support obligation as presently enforced through statutes and
case law. Emphasis is placed on ways of accomplishing such en-
forcement based on the individual capacity of each parent to pay
rather than on sexual stereotypes.
I. OVERVIEW
At early common law, the obligation to support one's children was
considered merely moral and insufficient to bind either parent le-
gally.' As the moral obligation evolved into a legal duty, the great
* J.D. 1977, University of Detroit School of Law, Member, Michigan Bar; law clerk to G.
Mennen Williams, Associate Justice, Michigan Supreme Court; Teaching Fellow, Detroit
College of Law.
1. A breach of the parental obligation, for whatever cause, justifies intervention by the
state as parens patriae to protect its interest in the physical and mental well-being of its
future citizens. See, e.g., State ex rel. Stearns County v. Beard, 59 Miss. 161 (1881); cf.
Blackley v. Blackley, 204 S.E.2d 678 (N.C. 1974) (holding that in a custody proceeding the
welfare of the child is the paramount consideration and that the trial judge should strive "to
place the child in an environment which will best promote the full development of his [or
her] physical, mental, moral, and spiritual faculties." Id. at 681).
2. State v. Thornton, 134 S.W. 519 (Mo. 1911); Willits v. Willits, 107 N.W. 379 (Neb.
1906); Coler v. Corn Exch. Bank, 164 N.E. 882 (N.Y. 1928), aff'd, 280 U.S. 218 (1930). See
also N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 415 (McKinney 1975), which imposes the support obligation even
on stepparents of a child who is likely to become a recipient of public welfare.
3. A recent study by the General Accounting Office on fathers of children on welfare who
had agreed to make child support payments, either voluntarily or under court order, reveals
that of fathers with annual incomes between $6,000 and $12,000, 66% were not in compliance.
Likewise, of those with annual incomes of more than $12,000, 70% were not in compliance.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1974, § 1, at 31, col. 1. See also note 205 infra; B. BROWN, A. FREEDMAN,
H. KATZ, & A. PRIcE, WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE LAW 146 (1977) [hereinafter cited as WOMEN'S
RiGHTs].
4. Porter v. Powell, 44 N.W. 295 (Iowa 1890); Kelley v. Davis, 49 N.H. 187 (1870); Gordon
v. Potter, 17 Vt. 348 (1845); Mortimore v. Wright, 6 M. & W. 482, 487 (Ex. 1840); see H.
CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMEsnc RELATIONS IN THE UNrrED STATES § 15.1, at 488 (1968) (regarding
a conflict in the early American cases).
The obligation was first established as a legal duty in 1601 by the passage of the statute of
43 Eliz., c. 2, art. VII, under which the parents and grandparents of a child were obligated to
provide for maintenance upon the order of two magistrates, on pain of criminal penalties and
seizure of personal property. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 447-48 (J. Wendell ed.
1847).
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majority of courts placed it solely upon the father.5 Justifications for
this disparate treatment included the common law disability of
women,' the weaker nature and minimal earning ability of women,'
the natural differences between the sexes,' and the fact that the
mother was not entitled to the services of her children.'
Support of dependent children is now a legally enforceable duty,
by statute or common law, in every jurisdiction.' 0 However, the
manner of enforcement varies. Generally, this duty is imposed in
three distinct ways: (1) placement of an absolute duty of support
on the father, (2) placement of a primary duty of support on the
father accompanied by a secondary duty on the mother, or (3)
placement of a presumptively equal duty on both parents.
A. Absolute Duty of Support on the Father
Under the "traditional view,"" "support of a child is exclusively
a father's obligation, and ... the wife's separate income, assets, and
ability to provide for the children are irrelevant to the father's obli-
gation to support the children."'" The inequity of this manner of
imposing the support duty is illustrated by Bill v. Bill, 13 an Indiana
case in which the court, relying on a state statute, adhered to the
rule of absolute liability of the father." In that case, a father ap-
5. Gilley v. Gilley, 9 A. 623 (Me. 1887); H. CLARK, supra note 4, at § 15.1, at 488. Contra,
Finch v. Finch, 22 Conn. 411 (1853); Purity Baking Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 166 N.E. 33
(Ill. 1929); Alvey v. Hartwig, 67 A. 132 (Md. 1907); Hunter v. State, 134 P. 1134 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1913).
6. See Gully v. Gully, 231 S.W. 97 (Tex. 1921); Magee v. White, 23 Tex. 180 (1859).
1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, at 441, states: "By marriage, the husband and wife are
one person in law; that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband ... 
7. See Ailing v. Ailing, 27 A. 655, 658 (N.J. Ch. 1893).
8. See Gully v. Gully, 231 S.W. 97 (Tex. 1921).
9. Gilley v. Gilley, 9 A. 623 (Me. 1887). At common law, in return for the duty of support,
a father was entitled to the services of his children during their minority. This meant that
he was entitled to their labor in his home or business or was entitled to their wages if they
were employed elsewhere. See Cragford Bank v. Cummings, 113 So. 243 (Ala. 1927).
See 27 ARK. L. REV. 157, 158 (1973).
10. H. CLARK, supra note 4, at § 15.1, at 488.
11. Bill v. Bill, 290 N.E.2d 749, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972). Although there is presently little
practical distinction between a father's "absolute" and "primary" liability for support, see
text accompanying note 34 infra, there was an historical distinction, see 27 ARK. L. REV. 157
(1973), which was perpetuated in Bill. This article, therefore, treats the areas separately.
12. Bill v. Bill, 290 N.E.2d 749, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972).
13. 290 N.E.2d 749 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972).
14. Taken literally, the statute did not place absolute support liability on the father:
The court in decreeing a divorce shall make provision for the guardianship, cus-
tody, support, and education of the minor children of such marriage; and the court
may require the father to provide all or some specified part of the cost of education
of such child or children beyond the twelfth year of education provided by the
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pealed from an order to pay $240 per week in child support. He
contended that the amount of the order was so excessive as to con-
stitute an abuse of discretion. At the time of the divorce the father's
net worth was $106,639. The mother, as beneficiary of a trust fund,
had a net worth of $450,000. Prior to the divorce, both parents had
made substantial financial contributions to the marriage.'5 Al-
though the court expressed reluctance about its decision," it stated
that even "[tiemporary forced indebtedness of the father and afflu-
ence of the mother. . . do not mitigate a father's firmly established
duty to support his progeny.'"'
The court, therefore, disregarded both the mother's present abil-
ity to make a monetary contribution to the support of her children
and the parents' prior practice of joint financial maintenance of
their home and family. Furthermore, this was not a situation in
which the court charged a nominal amount of support to a noncus-
todial father on the assumption that the mother, because of necess-
ity, would be forced to contribute her own assets. s The minimum
public schools, taking into consideration the earnings of the father, the station in
life of the parents and child or children involved, the aptitude of the child or
children as evidenced by school records, the separate property of the child or chil-
dren, and all other relevant factors: Provided, that the jurisdiction over the child
or children shall remain in the court at all times during the child's or children's
minority and shall not be lost because of the death of either parent.
Ch. 57, § 1, 1965 Ind. Acts 88 (current version at IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-12 (Burns Supp.
1977)) (emphasis added). The court, however, viewed precedent as interpreting the statute
to mean that support was exclusively a father's obligation. 290 N.E.2d at 756. Despite this,
the court said that the statute was sufficiently flexible to allow a trial court, in the proper
circumstances, to order contribution from the mother even though the father possessed ade-
quate financial means. For an appellate court to reverse, however, the court determined that
an abuse of the trial court's discretion must be found. Considering the rule in this jurisdiction,
the court could find no abuse of discretion, despite the exigencies of the case.
Although Bill involved a pendente lite support order, the statute and its prior interpreta-
tion are not limited to such orders. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that a permanent
support order would follow the same rule of absolute liability.
15. In fact, during the early years of marriage the wife contributed most of the couple's
income. After a number of years each was making a 50% contribution. 290 N.E.2d at 751.
16. The court admitted that the result was "harsh" and suggested that, as an alternative
remedy, the father seek modification of the support order in the lower court. Id. at 758.
Courts, however, are generally reluctant to modify support orders in the absence of a substan-
tial change of circumstances, which was not present in this case. See Doran v. Doran, 287
N.E.2d 731, 733 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972).
17. 290 N.E.2d at 758.
18. The statutory and common law requirements placing an absolute duty of support (or
primary duty, as discussed later in this article) on the father often differ substantially from
the realities of child support. The custodial parent, usually the mother, often bears the greater
burden to the extent that he or she must absorb the routine, day-to-day expenses which
appear inconsequential and unworthy of inclusion in the calculus used to determine the
amount of the noncustodial parent's contribution. Such expenses can, however, have a sub-
stantial cumulative impact. Also, support orders to the noncustodial parent are frequently
not compiled with, see note 3 supra and accompanying text; note 205 infra, and, except in
13191978]
1320 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:1317
total monthly amount payable by the father was $3,536. This in-
cluded the mortage payments on the home in which the mother and
four children resided, property taxes, insurance, and other related
expenses. In addition, he was required to pay medical, dental, and
educational expenses as they arose."
The same result, in certain cases, could be reached in jurisdic-
tions which place a presumptively equal duty of child support on
both parents." The inequity of a rule placing an absolute duty on
the father, however, lies in its inflexibility. In Bill, the mother
clearly was able to assist in providing for the monetary needs of the
children, yet the appellate court was not free to reverse.2' Tradition
and precedent compelled the court to perpetuate a double standard
which was manifestly inappropriate in the case to which it was
applied."
cases of parents of substantial means, support awards are often not large enough to cover all
the children's needs. Further, the greater time and care given by the custodial parent, though
not normally assessed in monetary terms, are substantial contributions to the children's
support.
Rather than recognizing these "monetary contributions by necessity" and the equally
important nonmonetary contributions, many courts and legislatures have perpetuated a sys-
tem of financial inequality. It is not unlikely that this inequality is responsible to some extent
for the statistically ineffectual enforcement of support orders. In Houston v. Snyder, 440
S.W.2d 156 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969), the court cautioned that a child support order "should not
be so great as to destroy the father's incentive ... " Id. at 161. There may be a nexus between
a father's feelings of discriminatory treatment under the law and his unwillingness to comply
with a court-ordered support obligation. Legislative and judicial recognition of support as a
shared responsibility and the actual contribution of each parent could result in a greater
incidence of compliance.
19. 290 N.E.2d at 752-53.
20. See note 204 infra. The circumstances under which the father should or should not
bear the total responsibility for child support were described in 1963 by the President's
Commission on the Status of Women:
Where the family decides it is necessary or desirable for the wife to work outside
the home, it is reasonable that her income, as well as the husband's, be used to help
support the children .... On the other hand, where the family decides that it is
necessary or desirable for the wife to work only in the home and the wife has no
independent income, the husband must necessarily bear the full responsibility for
family support.
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
AND POLrrIcAL RIGHTS 22 (1963).
21. See note 14 supra.
22. The court's call to the Indiana Legislature to "[bestir] itself to modernize our divorce
laws," 290 N.E.2d at 758, was apparently heeded. The statutory provision under which Bill
was decided was repealed by P.L. 297, § 3, 1973 Ind. Acts 1585. The current provision, IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-12 (Burns Supp. 1977), provides that "the court may order either
parent or both parents to pay any amount reasonable for support of a child .... (Emphasis
added.) Included among the factors the court is directed to consider are "the financial re-
sources of the custodial parent" and the "financial resources and needs of the noncustodial
parent."
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B. Primary Duty of Support on the Father
Most jurisdictions have retreated from absolute liability to a rule
under which the father is primarily liable for support payments,2 3
and the mother is secondarily liable.24 Although there is some disa-
greement as to when the mother's secondary obligation arises, 25 gen-
erally the father, as primary obligor, is initially the sole party upon
whom the legal duty of support rests. Should he be unable to fulfill
this obligation, a legal duty would be enforceable against the mother
as secondary obligor.
In O'Brien v. O'Brien,2 1 a Missouri court considered a father's
contention that the trial court had abused its discretion in ordering
him to pay child support when there was evidence that his ex-wife
had adequate means to support herself and the children. The
mother had been granted custody of one of the three minor children
and shared custody of another with the father. The third child was
in the full custody of the father. Both parents were gainfully em-
ployed.Y
The court affirmed an award to the mother of $250 per month in
child support. The individual circumstances did not outweigh the
"well established" rule in that jurisdiction28 that "it is the primary
duty of the father to support and educate his children notwithstand-
ing the fact that the mother may have independent means." 2
23. 27 ARK. L. REV. 157, 158 (1973); see H. CLAR, supra note 4, at § 15.1, at 488. As of
1968, 44 states and the District of Columbia followed a rule placing a primary duty of support
on the father and a secondary duty on the mother. United Nations Commission on the Status
of Women, Parental Rights and Duties, Including Guardianship, U.N. Doc. 6/474/Rev. 1, at
51 (1968). This number has since been reduced somewhat by statutory amendments. See note
48 and accompanying text infra.
24. E.g., McQuade v. McQuade, 358 P.2d 470 (Colo. 1960); Duncan v. Duncan, 146 So.
2d 255 (La. Ct. App. 1962); Boerger v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 100 N.W.2d 133 (Minn. 1959);
O'Brien v. O'Brien, 485 S.W.2d 674 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972); Williams v. Williams, 134 S.E.2d
227 (N.C. 1964); O'Leary v. Porter, 167 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1969). See also H. CLARK, supra
note 4, at § 15.1, at 488. For a typical statute placing a primary duty of support on the father
and a secondary duty on the mother, see N.Y. FAm. CT. ACr §§ 413-414 (McKinney 1975).
25. See 27 ARK. L. REV. 157, 158 (1973).
26. 485 S.W.2d 674 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
27. The father's take-home pay was $580 per month, while the mother's was $349.46 per
month. Additionally, the father's savings account totaled $15,000, while the mother had
savings of $17,000. The father also owned stock, the vast majority of which represented his
interest in the family restaurant. Id. at 675-76.
28. The Missouri support statute charges both parents with the duty of support. Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 559.353 (Vernon Supp. 1978). The imposition of a primary duty of support on the
father, therefore, was apparently based on tradition and judicial precedent. See Riggin v.
Riggin, 373 S.W.2d 633 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963); Mathews v. Mathews, 337 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1960).
29. 485 S.W.2d at 677. The decision was reversed as to the award of attorney's fees to the
mother. The court held that "allowances for counsel fees in proceedings of this nature are to
be determined by reference to the financial circumstances of both parties with the determina-
1978]
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The primary duty is more than a presumption in favor of a fa-
ther's duty of support. It normally amounts to an irrebuttable 31 legal
duty which is abrogated., only by circumstances rendering the fa-
ther's fulfillment impossible or nearly so.3 The mother's assets or
income-producing capacities are often disregarded in determining
the amount to be paid by the father.2 "[T]he measure of the fa-
ther's obligation is the child's needs in relation to the father's sta-
tion in life, his pecuniary resources, and his earning ability honestly
exercised." 33 The result of the rule imposing a primary duty of sup-
port on the father, therefore, is substantially the same as that of the
rule imposing an absolute liability. 4 Death appears to be the most
certain relief from primary liability, 35 but even this has been ques-
tioned .36
The imposition of either absolute or primary liability for child
tive inquiry being whether the wife is possessed of sufficient means on her own to prosecute
the suit." Id. at 678.
30. McQuade v. McQuade, 358 P.2d 470 (Colo. 1960); Dworkis v. Dworkis, 111 So. 2d 70
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 115 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1959); Gay v. Gay, 421 S.W,2d 603
(Ky. 1967); Brosam v. Brosam, 437 S.W.2d 694 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969); Trautman v. Trautman,
166 N.W.2d 415 (Neb. 1969); Williams v. Williams, 134 S.E.2d 227 (N.C. 1964).
31. The father may be relieved of his primary obligation because of illness, Cassas v.
Cassas, 276 P.2d 456 (Wyo. 1954); inability to "muster" sufficient funds, Farah v. Farah, 102
N.Y.S.2d 147 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1951); or death, DeSena v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 284
A.2d 363 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971). See also Copeland v. Copeland, 65 So. 2d 853 (Fla.
1953); Lewis v. Lewis, 151 N.Y.S.2d 894 (Sup. Ct. 1956), appeal dismissed, 174 N.Y.S.2d 241
(1958).
32. See cases cited note 30 supra.
33. Williams v. Williams, 134 S.E.2d 227, 233 (N.C. 1964).
34. Appellate courts have found the primary duty to be so basic as to enforce it irrespec-
tive of whether the trial court's divorce decree orders the father to pay child support, Ciociola
v. Ciociola, 302 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974); cf. Voss v. Voss, 415 P.2d 303 (Idaho
1966) (upholding trial court's order requiring father to pay $900 for past support of his child
for a period when there was no outstanding court order requiring him to make support
payments), and have called the duty nondelegable. Warrick v. Hender, 198 So. 2d 348 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1967); In re Adoption of P.J.K., 359 S.W.2d 360 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962). The
duty is not limited by the father's present earnings. The court may also consider his ability
to earn money and make an award based thereon. See Voss v. Voss, 415 P.2d 303.
35. Flagler v. Flagler, 94 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 1957); DeSena v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,
284 A.2d 363 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971).
36. The father is sometimes ordered, in partial fulfillment of his support obligation, to
carry life insurance on himself with his children as the designated beneficiaries. See, e.g.,
Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Kitchens, 249 Cal. App. 2d 623 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Guggenhei-
mer v. Guggenheimer, 112 A.2d 61 (N.H. 1955), discussed in 35 B.U. L. REv. 596 (1955);
Grotsky v. Grotsky, 277 A.2d 535 (N.J. 1971). But see Budig v. Budig, 481 S.W.2d 95 (Ky.
1972). See generally Foster, Freed, & Midonick, Child Support: The Quick and the Dead, 26
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1157 (1975).
This type of order is not necessarily limited to jurisdictions which place a primary duty of
support on the father. Colorado statutorily holds each parent liable for child support, COLO.
REV. STAT. § 14-10-115 (1973), and a recent decision ordered both parents to carry life insur-
ance with the children as beneficiaries. In re Marriage of Icke, 530 P.2d 1001 (Colo. Ct. App.
1974), aff'd, 540 P.2d 1076 (Colo. 1975).
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support on the father perpetuates a double standard which, al-
though perhaps warranted at one time, appears unjustified today."
The financial responsibilities of families are increasingly borne
jointly by men and women. In 1974, 54.2% of all women between the
ages of eighteen and sixty-four were in the labor force." Of mothers
who were widowed, divorced, or separated, 67.3% were employed. 3
Additionally, 51.2% of mothers whose husbands were present in the
household were working." These statistics evidence a sharp increase
over the past several years in the number of working married
women.4' Although women's average earnings remain less than
those of men,4" and the rate of unemployment for women is higher
37. This double standard is not limited to the area of child support. Then United States
Representative Martha Griffiths, in discussing federal income security programs, stated:
The income security programs of this nation were designed for . . . a land where
all men were breadwinners and all women were wives or widows; where men pro-
vided necessary income for their families but women did not; in other words, where
all of the men supported all of the women. This view of the world never matched
reality, but today it is further than ever from the truth.
Griffiths, Sex Discrimination in Income Security Programs, 49 NOTRE DAME LAw. 534, 534
(1974).
38. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 535 n.17 (1975) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN
IN THE LABOR FORCE (Oct. 1974)).
39. Id. (citing U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MABRAL AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LABOR
FORCE, Table F (March 1974)).
40. Id. Furthermore, most mothers work for financial reasons, and, in homes in which
both parents were present, working wives accounted for 26% of family income. COUNCIL OF
NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH, AMERICA's CHILDREN: A BICENTENNIAL
ASSESSMENT 57 (1976).
41. In 1940, 14% of married women were employed. In 1970, this figure had risen to 40%.
U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, RESEARCH




MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP INCOME INCOME
Professional and Technical workers 8,346 69
Nonfarm managers and administrators 7,312 56
Clerical workers 5,718 62
Sales workers 4,549 43
Operatives, including transport 4,798 61
Service workers (except private
household) 4,280 60
U.S. EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, WOMEN'S BUREAU, DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN
WORKERS TODAY 6 (rev. ed. 1973).
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than that for men, 3 these conditions are being equalized." The
present situation certainly warrants replacement of the double stan-
dard in child support with a case-by-case analysis of individual
circumstances and an equitable apportionment of the support obli-
gation .5
C. Presumptively Equal Support Obligation on Both Parents
The most recent trend in the area of child support is to allocate
the responsibility between both parents, that is, to place a presump-




RACE AND AGE WOMEN MEN
All races 6.6 4.9
16 to 19 years 16.7 15.9
20 years and over 5.4 4.0
Minority races 11.3 8.9
16 to 19 years 38.6 29.8
20 years and over 8.8 6.8
Id.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Supp. V 1975) provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer . . . (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive. . . any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
•... sex .. .. "
Recent decisions demonstrate that female-protective statutes and practices concerning
employment cannot be preserved under this act. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
400 U.S. 542 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring); Jones Metal Prods. Co. v. Walker, 281 N.E.2d
1 (Ohio 1972); Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 617, 619 (1974). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (Supp. V 1975); 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).
45. Despite the normal irrebuttability of the father's primary duty of support, one court
allowed an exception in the case of a contractual obligation assumed by a mother. In Barn-
hard v. Barnhard, 477 S.W.2d 845 (Ark. 1972), a noncustodial mother appealed to the Su-
preme Court of Arkansas seeking relief from child support payments and restoration of her
one-half interest in the home in which her ex-husband and children resided. She was earning
$46,000 per year at the time the complaint was filed. The court placed great emphasis on the
fact that the parties had entered into the support agreement privately and through the wife's
attorney. Furthermore, the mother was earning substantially more than was her ex-husband.
Despite the court's recognition that, in Arkansas, the general rule is that the father has the
primary obligation for support of his children, id. at 848, it could find no change in circum-
stances sufficient to warrant granting the requested relief. The decision of the lower court was
affirmed. Accord, McFarlin v. Crawford, 546 P.2d 855 (Idaho 1976). For a discussion of
Barnhard, see 27 ARK. L. Rxv. 157 (1973).
46. See Hursh v. Hursh, 326 N.E.2d 95 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975); Spaulding v. Spaulding, 204
N.W.2d 634 (Iowa 1973); In re Waymire, 522 P.2d 1394 (Or. Ct. App. 1974); D'Ambrosio v.
D'Ambrosio, 515 P.2d 1353 (Or. Ct. App. 1973); Garrett v. Garrett, 409 P.2d 470 (Wash. 1965);
Woodward v. Woodward, 428 P.2d 389 (Wyo. 1967).
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obligation is not new47 but has recently gained even wider accept-
ance in up-dated support statutes." The trend has been strength-
ened further by societal changes which increase the feasibility of
charging women with such a duty.
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act refers to "either or both
parents owing a duty of support" and lists factors to be considered
by courts when determining respective support obligations. Among
the factors listed are "the financial resources of the custodial par-
ent" and "the financial resources and needs of the noncustodial
parent."4 The Act has been adopted in part by five states,M and two
more have substantially similar provisions.5 The Act should serve
as a model for state statutory change and may also serve as a model
for courts in interpreting present support statutes.
The well-being of children is in no way sacrificed by this abolition
of the double standard in child support. In fact, the goal of the state
in the imposition of the support duty5 is furthered by holding two
potential wage earners liable simultaneously for the same obligation
and placing a reasonable burden on each. In addition, by acknowl-
47. See, e.g., Finch v. Finch, 22 Conn. 411 (1853); Webb v. Daiger, 173 A.2d 920 (D.C.
1961); Purity Baking Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 166 N.E. 33 (Ill. 1929); Stillmunkes v.
Stillmunkes, 65 N.W.2d 366 (Iowa 1954); Hood v. Hood, 113 A. 895 (Md. 1921); Alvey v.
Hartwig, 67 A. 132 (Md. 1907); Lowry v. Lowry, 90 So. 2d 852 (Miss. 1956); Cupit v. Brooks,
79 So. 2d 478 (Miss. 1955); Bruguier v. Bruguier, 79 A.2d 497 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1951).
48. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.210 (1962); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-115 (1973); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-57 (West 1978); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 16-916 (West Supp. 1977-78); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 19 (1975); IowA CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West Supp. 1978); LA. Civ. CODE
ANN. art. 227 (West 1952); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 48-323 (Supp. 1977); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 458:17 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 34-23 (West Supp. 1977-78); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 22-7-6 to 15 (Supp. 1975); OR. REv. STAT. § 107.105(1) (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. §
30-3-5 (1953); VA. CODE § 20-107 (Supp. 1977); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.09.100 (Supp.
1977); Wyo. STAT. § 20-2-113 (1977). For a detailed graphic breakdown of all state child
support statutes, see WOMEN'S RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 147-55.
49. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 309.
In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, maintenance, or
child support, the court may order either or both parents owing a duty of support
to a child to pay an amount reasonable or necessary for his support, without regard
to marital misconduct, after considering all relevant factors including:
(1) the financial resources of the child;
(2) the financial resources of the custodial parent;
(3) the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage
not been dissolved;
(4) the physical and emotional condition of the child and his educational
needs; and
(5) the financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent.
Id.
50. Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, and Montana. See 9 UNIFORM LAWS Aim. 360
(Supp. 1974-77).
51. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 74.101-.110 (1973) (although child support provision follows abso-
lute liability on father and not Uniform Act); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. ch. 26.16 (Supp. 1976).
52. See notes 1-2 supra and accompanying text.
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edging and assessing each parent's contribution, both monetary and
nonmonetary, a more realistic and effective system of support can
be established.5 3
However, when courts appear to embrace the concept of a pre-
sumptively equal obligation, the results are often inconsistent.
Child support laws have evolved from a long tradition of woman's
dependency on man.54 As a result, the gender-based double standard
remains as a basis for distinction.
One court appeared to break with this tradition, at least to the
extent required by equity, some time ago. In 1933, the Supreme
Court of Tennessee, in Brooks v. Brooks, 55 relying on a state statute
imposing equal and joint liability on parents for support of their
children," determined that both parents were liable for past debts
incurred in the necessary support of their children, to the extent of
the parents' relative financial abilities.57 Seven years later the same
court reaffirmed its position: "[Tihe obligation for the support of
a minor child is no longer primarily charged upon the father, but
father and mother are equally and jointly charged with the child's
. ..support."58
Both these cases, however, were brought by custodial mothers
seeking contribution from their ex-husbands. Thus, their value as
precedent for the view that women should carry a burden equal to
that carried by men is not as strong as it would be had they involved
men seeking support payments from women. This became evident
when, in 1970, a custodial father brought an action under the same
statute seeking contribution for future child support from his ex-
53. See note 2 supra.
54. Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many
of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which
is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of
womanhood....
... The paramount destiny and mission of woman are [sic].to fulfil the noble
and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.
Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
55. 61 S.W.2d 654 (Tenn. 1933).
56. Ch. 41, § 1, 1923 Tenn. Pub. Acts 123 (current version at TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-101
(1977)).
57. The obligation of both to provide a support for their child is equal and joint, in
so far as the child is concerned, but a controversy between the parents, as to the
proper contribution of each, seems to us to be determinable only by equitable
principles and rules, with due regard to the condition and means of each.
61 S.W.2d at 654.
58. Rose Funeral Home, Inc. v. Julian, 144 S.W.2d 755, 757 (Tenn. 1940).
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wife, who was then gainfully employed.5 The Tennessee Court of
Appeals noted that none of the cases decided under the statute had
dealt with an allowance for future support. The court further noted
that no prior cases had involved a request by a father for contribu-
tion from the mother. On the basis of these distinctions, which
appear insubstantial in light of the language of the two earlier cases,
the court disallowed recovery, relying on a provision in the Tennes-
see divorce statute0 which provided that in a divorce action "the
court may decree that suitable support be made by the father."'"
This variance between the child support duty as literally imposed
by a state statute and the duty as actually enforced by the courts
is not uncommon. Iowa's support law places equal responsibility on
both parents for family expenses and the education of their chil-
dren. 2 Upon examining cases decided under this law, however, Pro-
fessor Homer Clark concluded that most child support orders in
Iowa are still given against the father. 3
In New Mexico the courts are authorized by statute to make
allowance from the property of either parent for the support of the
children. 4 Although that statute had been in force since 1953, the
authors of a 1973 law review article were unable to find a single case
in which "the wife was required to pay child support to the husband
for children placed in his custody. 6 15
The double standard again prevailed, despite a gender-neutral
statute,6 in D'Ambrosio v. D'Ambrosio.6 1 There, the Oregon Court
of Appeals actually acknowledged the neutrality of the state stat-
ute: "In Oregon the sex of a noncustodial parent is immaterial in
determining his or her duty to contribute child support."68
59. Hilton v. Hilton, 463 S.W.2d 955 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970), denial of cert. noted, 463
S.W.2d 955 (Tenn. 1971).
60. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-828 (1955) (current version at TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-828
(1977)).
61. 463 S.W.2d at 956. The statute has since been amended and now provides that "the
court may decree that suitable support be made by the natural parents .... ." TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-828 (1977).
62. IOWA CODE ANN. § 597.14 (West 1950).
63. H. CLARK, supra note 4, at § 15.1, at 488-89 n.7. But see Beasley v. Beasley, 159
N.W.2d 449 (Iowa 1968), in which a mother was required to pay child support for the nine
months of each year that the oldest child attended college.
64. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-15 (1953).
65. Behles & Behles, Equal Rights in Divorce and Separation, 3 N.M.L. REV. 118, 133
(1973). The authors concluded that "[flor practical purposes the responsibility of paying
child support is normally solely on the husband, whether he is given custody or not." Id. at
133-34.
66. OR. REv. STAT. § 107.105(1) (1977).
67. 515 P.2d 1353 (Or. Ct. App. 1973).
68. Id. at 1354 (emphasis added).
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The father in D'Ambrosio had custody of the parties' three chil-
dren. He appealed from a denial of his motion for an order requiring
the mother to pay child support. The mother was employed and
earning about $600 per month." She testified at trial that she did
not wish to work permanently but merely wanted to pay some bills
and intended to remarry.70 The court based its denial of the father's
motion on the lack of a sufficient change of circumstances to justify
modification of the divorce decree.7 At the same time, the court
expressed doubt as to whether a noncustodial father earning $600
per month would not be required by "any court . . . to pay some
child support just because he was paying off debts . .".72
Thus, despite "the present trend in domestic relations law.., to
recognize the ever increasing equality of spouses,"7 the law of child
support is still a confusing and conflicting mixture of tradition,
statutory law, and case law. Attempts are being made, though, to
bring about true equality in shouldering the support obligation.
Legislative reform must remain the primary goal. When statutes
placing a disparate duty of support on the father disappear, courts
will be less likely to rely on that method of enforcement. As the
decisions indicate, however, legislative reform alone is not suffi-
cient. To accomplish real and widespread change in the area of child
support, courts as well as legislatures must reevaluate the use of
gender as a basis of distinction in all areas of the law. This process
has begun through interpretation of the Federal Constitution.
II. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Various statutes that discriminate on the basis of sex have been
challenged through the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution.7' This has proven to
69. The father was earning approximately $1,000 per month at the time the action was
brought. Id.
70. The mother had terminated less lucrative employment as a sales clerk and had com-
menced working at a lumber mill. She also had had another child subsequent to the divorce
and testified: "I just want to quit work and have a happy home when I got [sic] married."
Id. The lower court commended her for not going on welfare and held that the father's income
of $1,000 per month was sufficient to support the three children in his custody. Id.
It is interesting to note that, despite the statute, the trial judge, in almost 18 years on the
bench, had never been faced with a support request from a father. Id.
71. Id. at 1354-55.
72. Id. at 1354 (emphasis added).
73. Gabler, The Impact of the ERA on Domestic Relations Law: Specific Focus on
California, 8 FAM. L.Q. 51, 56 (1974).
74. "[Nlor shall any state . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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be a relatively successful means by which to attack such statutes,7 5
but its use as an ultimate tool in the area of child support is uncer-
tain.
The traditional test employed by the United States Supreme
Court in equal protection challenges is the rational basis test.7"
Under this test, a classification or distinction made in a legislative
enactment is presumptively constitutional." The classification or
distinction must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must be ration-
ally related to a valid public purpose.78 If there is any reasonable
justification for the legislative decision, it will be upheld.
Although continuing to employ the rational basis test in some
cases, the Court has developed a second test for evaluating legisla-
tion affecting a fundamental interest7 or classifying in an invidious
manner8 Such laws are considered suspect, and, as such, they are
subjected to strict scrutiny. The Court requires the demonstration
of a compelling state interest in order for such laws to withstand an
equal protection challenge. This requirement places a burden on the
state or federal government which can rarely be met."' Thus, the
''aggressive 'new' equal protection" applies "scrutiny that [is]
'strict' in theory and fatal in fact ...."12
75. Advocates of the equal rights amendment, however, are generally pessimistic about
the potential for obtaining true sexual equality through the equal protection clause:
In past years many proponents of equal rights for women believed that the goal
could be achieved through judicial interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
... .An examination of the decisions of the Supreme Court demonstrates that
there is no present likelihood that the Court will apply the Equal Protection Clause
in a manner that will effectively guarantee equality of rights for women. More
important, equal protection doctrines, even in their most progressive form, are
ultimately inadequate for that task.
Brown, Emerson, Falk, & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis
for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 875 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Brown]. See
also Dorsen & Ross, The Necessity of a Constitutional Amendment, 6 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
216, 218 (1971).
76. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
(1948).
77. Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAv. L. Rsv. 1, 19-20 (1972).
78. Goesaert.v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). "One who assails the classification in such a
law must carry the burden of showing it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is
essentially arbitrary." Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
79. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
80. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (alienage); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(national origin).
81. Note, Equality for Men and Women, Three Approaches: Frontiero, The Equal Rights
Amendment, and the Montana Equal Dignities Provision, 35 MoNT. L. lRv. 325, 328 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Three Approaches].
82. Gunther, supra note 77, at 8.
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Many of the classifications which have been deemed suspect are
based on immutable characteristics.8 3 Despite the fact that sex is
such a characteristic, it was not termed suspect by the Warren
Court, and it has not been so labeled by the Burger Court.8' In fact,
the Burger Court has not consistently employed the two-tiered, that
is, rational basis versus strict scrutiny, approach of the Warren
Court.85 Rather, it has sought to develop a new, middle standard by
which to deal with the great bulk of legislation challenged under the
equal protection clause .8 One commentator has described this new-
est standard as follows:
The model suggested by the recent developments would view
equal protection as a means-focused, relatively narrow, preferred
ground of decision in a broad range of cases. Stated most simply,
it would have the Court take seriously a constitutional requirement
that has never been formally abandoned: that legislative means
must substantially further legislative ends....
... The yardstick for the acceptability of the means would be
the purposes chosen by the legislatures, not "constitutional" inter-
ests drawn from the value perceptions of the Justices. 7
Under this "means-focused" equal protection analysis, the Court
has avoided expansion of strict scrutiny while also avoiding the
noninterventionist approach of the rational basis test.8 What has
appeared to evolve in many decisions has been termed by Professor
Gunther as "minimum scrutiny with bite. 8 9 To understand the
future of gender-based statutes under equal protection, including
those imposing a double standard in the area of child support, an
examination of some of these recent decisions is necessary.
In Reed v. Reed, an Idaho statute giving preference to men over
similarly situated women as administrators of estates was unani-
mously declared unconstitutional." The Court found the sex cri-
83. See cases cited note 80 supra.
84. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). But see
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), in which a four-justice plurality declared that
sex was a suspect classification.
85. Gunther, supra note 77, at 17.
86. Id. at 20-21; see Johnston, Sex Discrimination and The Supreme Court-1975, 23
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 235 (1975); Note, The Emerging Bifurcated Standard for Classifications
Based on Sex, 1975 DuKE L.J. 163, 166 [hereinafter cited as Emerging Bifurcated Standard];
Note, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld: Equal Protection and Sex Classifications in Government
Benefit Programs, 5 N.M.L. REv. 335 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Benefit Programs].
87. Gunther, supra note 77, at 20-21 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 12, 18-20.
89. G. GuNTHER, CASES AND MATmEULS ON CoNsTrruTiONAL LAW 661 (9th ed. 1975).
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terion "arbitrary" 9' and rejected the state's contention that the
classification was reasonable because it reduced family disputes
and avoided the need for administrative hearings:
To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over
members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of
hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legisla-
tive choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment; and whatever may be said as to the positive
values of avoiding intrafamily controversy, the choice in this con-
text may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex.,,
The Court purported to confine its analysis in Reed to the rational
basis test.'3 Under that test as traditionally applied, however, the
statute would probably have been upheld.4 The actual test em-
ployed by the Court was a modified rational basis test, 5 neither
subjecting the legislation to strict scrutiny nor deferring to a pre-
sumption of constitutionality.N
Two years later, in Frontiero v. Richardson, the Court denounced
sex discrimination as " 'romantic paternalism.' -97 The Court held
statutes98 unconstitutional which allowed male members of the
armed forces" to claim wives as dependents without requiring inves-
tigation or proof of dependency while requiring servicewomen to
prove claimed dependency of husbands.100 The Court held that ad-
90. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
91. Id. at 76.
92. Id. at 76-77.
93. "The question presented by this case, then, is whether difference in the sex of com-
peting applicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship to a state objective
.... " Id. at 76.
94. See Emerging Bifurcated Standard, supra note 86, at 172-73.
95. Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 617, 622 (1974).
96. One authority, in analyzing Reed, felt that the Court not only avoided strong reliance
on either of the prior tests, but also avoided enunciating any new standard of review. See
Gunther, supra note 77, at 34.
97. 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
98. 10 U.S.C. § 1072 (1970); 37 U.S.C. § 401 (1970) (amended 1973).
99. The suit was brought against the federal government. Thus, Frontiero challenged the
statutes under the due process clause of the fifth amendment because the fourteenth amend-
ment runs only against the states. The fifth amendment due process clause has been held to
encompass the concept of fourteenth amendment equal protection. Hampton v. Wong, 426
U.S. 88 (1976); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
100. Successful dependency claims resulted in the award of increased living quarter allow-
ances and the receipt of medical and dental benefits for the spouse. The statutes created a
rebuttable presumption against a husband's dependency on his wife. By analogy, if child
support statutes were enacted with a rebuttable presumption in favor of a father's duty of
support, they could perhaps be declared invalid under Frontiero.
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ministrative convenience did not justify the gender-based classifica-
tion. 10 Four justices concluded that changes in society required that
classifications based on sex be considered suspect."' However, Jus-
tice Powell, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Blackmun and
Chief Justice Burger, cited the pendency of the equal rights amend-
ment as reason for not declaring sex a suspect classification.' 3
In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 101 the Court found a denial of equal
protection in a provision of the Social Security Act0 5 which made
sex the sole determinant of whether the surviving spouse of a de-
ceased wage earner received benefits while caring for a dependent
child.' " Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, found this provision
indistinguishable from the statute in Frontiero. "7 Though it is un-
clear which test, if any, was employed, 0 8 the statute was described
as an " 'archaic and overbroad' generalization," '"' and the Court
criticized the gender-based distinction drawn such, "that male
workers' earnings are vital to the support of their families, while the
earnings of female wage earners do not significantly contribute to
their families' support."" 0
The statute in Wiesenfeld had as its facial goal the protection of
women and children."' The Court, however, did not confine its anal-
ysis to these protective aspects of the statute. The law denied equal
101. 411 U.S. at 688-91.
102. Id. at 686-87 (Brennan, J., joined by Douglas, Marshall, and White, JJ.). Justices
Douglas and White, in subsequent cases, departed from the view that classifications based
on sex are suspect-Justice Douglas in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), and Justice
White in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Some commentators, however, are doubtful
as to whether designation of sex as a suspect classification would be sufficient to render all
statutes containing such a classification invalid.
The suspect classification test provides a potential basis for more comprehensive
protection against sex discrimination; under its operation, sex-based classifications
would be considered "suspect" and subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. But be-
cause this doctrine allows the government to justify even a suspect classification
by "compelling reasons," it would permit some classifications based on sex to
survive.
Brown, supra note 75, at 880; see Dorsen & Ross, supra note 75, at 218.
103. 411 U.S. at 692.
104. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1970).
106. This case, like Frontiero, was brought under the fifth amendment due process clause.
See note 99 supra.
107. 420 U.S. at 642-43.
108. See Johnston, supra note 86, at 256 (expressing the view that no test was articulated);
Benefit Programs, supra note 86, at 339 (stating that Wiesenfeld holds that a "highly rational
connection between legitimate legislative ends and statutory means will have to be shown in
order for a sex-based classification to withstand an equal protection challenge" (emphasis
added)).
109. 420 U.S. at 643 (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975)).
110. 420 U.S. at 643.
111. Id. at 646.
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benefits to the survivors of women who had worked to support their
families"' and disregarded the plight of widowers left with young
children by refusing them benefits in the same manner permitted
similarly situated widows." 3
The Court again examined a statute which discriminated on the
basis of sex in Stanton v. Stanton.'I The equal protection issue
involved the constitutionality of a state statute which established
eighteen as the age of majority for females and twenty-one as the
age of majority for males." 5 The parties had executed a child sup-
port agreement pursuant to their divorce in 1960. The agreement
did not specify the age at which the obligation ceased, and the
father terminated payments for the daughter when she reached
eighteen. The Utah Supreme Court, in upholding the statute under
the rational basis test,"' relied in part on what it referred to as "old
notions" that "generally it is the man's primary responsibility to
provide a home and its essentials"'' 7 and thereby recognized that
the greater need for an education justified the gender-based distinc-
tion."'
The United States Supreme Court held, on the authority of
Reed, ,s9 that the statute could not survive an equal protection at-
tack "under any test-compelling state interest, or rational basis,
or something in between . ... ""' The Court noted societal changes
which made the statute, within the context of child support,' 2 ' un-
constitutional: "Women's activities and responsibilities are increas-
ing and expanding .... The presence of women in business, in the
professions, in government and, indeed, in all walks of life where
112. Id. at 645.
113. Id. at 650-52.
114. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
115. UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-2-1 (1953). The statute has since been amended and now
provides that 18 is the age of majority for both sexes. UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-2-1 (Supp. 1977).
116. "There is no doubt that the questioned statute treats men and women
differently," but . . . people may be treated differently "so long as there is a
reasonable basis for the classification, which is related to the purposes of the act,
and it applies equally and uniformly to all persons within the class."
421 U.S. at 10 (quoting the Utah Supreme Court's decision, 517 P.2d 1010, 1012 (Utah 1974)
(emphasis added)).
117. 517 P.2d 1010, 1012 (Utah 1974). The court's language regarding a man's primary
responsibility is inconsistent with the spirit of Utah's statutory scheme, which charges both
parents with the duty of child support. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-3(4) (1953) (charges Father
with support of wife and children); id. § 78-45-4 (charges mother with support of husband
and children). Furthermore, the Utah Constitution contains an equal rights amendment.
UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 1.
118. 517 P.2d at 1012.
119. 421 U.S. at 13.
120. Id. at 17.
121. Id.
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education is a desirable, if not always a necessary, antecedent is
apparent and a proper subject of judicial notice."'2
Despite the Court's apparent willingness in these decisions to
require a substantial justification for legislation creating a gender-
based classification, two cases decided between Frontiero and
Wiesenfeld raised doubt about equal protection as a basis for chal-
lenging statutes which did not discriminate against women but, in
fact, were designed to protect them.
In Kahn v. Shevin,113 Justice Douglas' opinion for the majority
seemed to return to the "romantic paternalism" approach de-
nounced in Frontiero. The case involved a Florida law which
granted a property tax exemption to widows but not to widowers.
The Court upheld the law on the ground that it compensated for the
"overt discrimination" and the "socialization process of a male-
dominated culture" to which women were historically subjected.,',
In two dissenting opinions, the three justices who, with Justice
Douglas, found such a classification suspect in Frontiero, found the
Florida tax law to be overinclusive by including all women and
underinclusive by excluding all men.2 5
Similarly, in Schlesinger v. Ballard, a male naval officer chal-
lenged a rule under which women officers were given four years
longer than men to achieve promotion or receive a mandatory dis-
charge. 26 The majority held the classification reasonable in view of
a woman's lesser opportunity to achieve promotion through combat
and sea duty.27 The dissenters, on the other hand, found no suffi-
cient governmental interest served by the statutory classification. s2
They pointed out that the Court had "recently declined to manufac-
ture justifications in order to save an apparently invalid statutory
classification." '
In both Kahn and Ballard, the Court applied the rational basis
test rather than the newer "means" scrutiny.1ss In Kahn, the Court
122. Id. at 15.
123. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
124. Id. at 353.
125. Id. at 357-61.
126. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
127. Id. at 508.
128. Id. at 517.
129. Id. at 520.
130. In Kahn, the Court, although citing Reed, stated that "[w]here taxation is con-
cerned and no specific federal right, apart from equal protection, is imperiled, the States have
large leeway in making classifications and drawing lines ...." 416 U.S. at 355. Thus, the
presumption of constitutionality embodied in the rational basis test was utilized. The Court
went on to say that "[a] state tax law is not arbitrary although it 'discriminate[s] in favor
of a certain class . . . if the discrimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction, or
difference in state policy.'" Id. (quoting Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959)).
CHILD SUPPORT
stated that the statute was "reasonably designed to further the state
policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the
sex for which that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy bur-
den.""'3 The Court appeared to carve out an exception to the newer
equal protection standard for statutes which purported to "alleviate
the effects of past invidious discrimination."'3 2
One court interpreted a gender-based child support statute as
similar in purpose to the statute upheld in Kahn. In 1974, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court, in People v. Elliott, 3 sustained a conviction
under a statute which imposed criminal sanctions solely against the
father for nonpayment of child support.'3 The court, applying the
rational basis test, held that the statute did not violate the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.'13 The statute's
nonapplicability to mothers was justified on the ground that men's
economic advantages placed them in a better position to fulfill the
duty of child support. The court explained:
The proposition, that men generally are more economically favored
and, therefore, better able to support their children, is not entirely
an obsolete concept. In April of this year the United States Su-
preme Court gave judicial notice to this view in sustaining a five
hundred dollar property tax exemption to widows but not to wid-
owers, in Kahn v. Shevin. .... 1.
The conclusion reached in Elliott, however, need not be predictive
of the result of future equal protection challenges to the double
standard in child support. At least one authority interpreted
Wiesenfeld, decided six months after Elliott, as a retreat from the
deference previously accorded female-protective statutes: "In
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld ... the Court said it would not accept at
face value, as an automatic shield for discrimination, recitation of
woman-protective purposes for laws that associate women with the
In Ballard, the Court merely looked to the rationality of Congress' belief underlying the
statutory classification. 419 U.S. at 508-09.
131. 416 U.S. at 355.
132. Emerging Bifurcated Standard, supra note 86, at 181.
133. 525 P.2d 457 (Colo. 1974).
134. Ch. 124, § 1, 1955 Colo. Sess. Laws 287 (current version at CoLO. REv. STAT. § 14-6-
101 (1973)). The amended statute imposes a like obligation on both parents, but it was not
applicable in Elliott because it took effect subsequent to the crime in question. Ch. 160, § 1,
1973 Colo. Seas. Laws 547 (codified at COLO. Ray. STAT. § 14-6-101 (1973)).
135. 525 P.2d at 460. The court refused to declare sex a suspect classification and declared
an intention to apply the "traditional equal protection test." Id. Despite the fact that the
court quoted Reed as an example of the traditional test, a reading of the case indicates that
the old rational basis test was applied in Elliott.
136. Id.
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hearth, men with the wide world outside the home."' 37
Furthermore, the espoused purpose of gender-based support stat-
utes is not the protection of women but rather the protection of
children. Such statutes are based on the policy that the financial
protection of children can best be assured by imposing the support
duty on the source which was historically considered the most rea-
sonable-the father.'3 ' Considering the increasing number of work-
ing mothers, 3' the imposition of absolute or primary liability on the
father-rather than the imposition of a presumptively equal duty on
both parents-is no longer rationally related to the protection of
children. Recent equal protection decisions have recognized that the
father is no longer the sole provider for the family. 1" 0 Legislatures
and courts which perpetuate a double standard in child support
ignore this fact.
However, in another case, People v. Olague,"' a California court
rendered a decision similar to that in Elliott. In Olague, a father
alleged that California's statute criminalizing nonsupport 2 invidi-
ously discriminated by imposing sanctions primarily against fathers
and only secondarily against mothers. He claimed a denial of equal
protection in that the statute-by holding mothers liable as
well-implied on its face that mothers were equally capable of sup-
porting their children."3 Even though California's civil support stat-
137. Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CiN. L. lav. 1, 41 (1975). This view
may be overly optimistic, however. The statute in Wiesenfeld was also interpreted as discrim-
inatory against women as well as men. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645
(1975). Further, the Court stated in Wiesenfeld that, "[slince the gender-based classification
• * . cannot be explained as an attempt to provide for the special problems of women, it is
indistinguishable from the classification held invalid in Frontiero. " Id. at 653.
138. See notes 1-2 supra and accompanying text.
139. See notes 38-44 supra and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 643.
141. 106 Cal. Rptr. 612 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1973).
142. Ch. 1587, § 1, 1971 Cal. Stats. 3202 (current version at CAL. PiAL CODE § 207 (West
Supp. 1978)).
143. The statute provided in part:
A father of either a legitimate or illegitimate minor child who willfully omits
without lawful excuse to furnish necessary clothing, food, shelter or medical atten-
dance or other remedial care for his child is guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable
by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment in the
county jail not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
In the event that the father of either a legitimate or illegitimate minor child [fails
to provide such support], the mother of said child shall become subject to the
provisions of this section and be criminally liable for the support of said minor child
during the period of failure on the part of the father to the same extent and in the
same manner as the father.
Id. The statute has since been amended and is now gender-neutral. See note 155 infra.
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ute imposed an equal duty on both parents,'" and sex had been
declared a suspect classification in that state,"5 the court reversed
the trial court's ruling that the statute was unconstitutional.
The court concluded that the statute did not discriminate on the
basis of sex, but that it merely differentiated "between mothers as
a class and fathers as a class," and therefore was not subject to strict
scrutiny.'" Additionally, the purpose of the law was to "secure sup-
port of the child .... ,"', Thus, the statute was "economic and social
welfare legislation,""' which need bear only "a rational relationship
to a conceivably legitimate state purpose,""'' and was presump-
tively constitutional.1e Despite the court's willingness to take judi-
cial notice of changes in the stereotypical sex roles, 5' it held the
economic differences still existing between the sexes sufficient to
warrant the means employed by the statute. 52
The Olague decision evidenced questionable reasoning in finding
a lack of discrimination based on sex'5 and showed disregard for the
standards set out in Reed: "The Equal Protection Clause . . .
den[ies] to States the power to legislate that different treatment
be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on
the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that stat-
ute." 154 Furthermore, cases such as Wiesenfeld may dispel the no-
tion that economic and social welfare legislation warrants a pre-
sumption of constitutionality.'"
Although the United States Supreme Court and most lower courts
do not appear ready to treat sex as a suspect classification,15 there
144. CAL. CIV. CODE § 206 (West 1970).
145. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 540 (Cal. 1971).
146. 106 Cal. Rptr. at 614 (emphasis in original).
147. Id. (quoting People v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495, 500 (Cal. 1968)).




152. Id. at 615-16.
153. See 14 SANTA CLARA LAw. 148, 152 (1973).
154. 404 U.S. at 75-76. The Court's dicta concerning the disparity in economic opportuni-
ties between the sexes notwithstanding, the statutory differentiation would seem to advance
the purpose of support for the child very little if at all.
155. Prior to Wiesenfeld, the Supreme Court, despite a gender-based equal protection
challenge, had employed a more lenient standard in examining social and welfare legislation
in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). The Court upheld California's insurance program,
which paid benefits for most but not all physical and mental disabilities but did not pay
benefits for normal pregnancy and childbirth. See also Gunther, supra note 77, at 23.
It is important to note that the statute under which Olague was convicted has since been
amended and now imposes a unified obligation on the "parent[s] of a minor child." See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 207 (West Supp. 1978).
156. But see United States v. Reiser, 394 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Mont. 1975), rev'd, 532 F.2d
673 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 838 (1976); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529 (Cal.
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is some justification for optimism regarding the use of the newest
equal protection standard as a tool for elimination of the double
standard in child support. 57 The Supreme Court is backing away
from the deference once accorded legislative decisions. In fact, at
the May 30, 1978, session, the Court granted review in Orr v. Orr to
decide whether Alabama's alimony statute, which charges only men
with the alimony obligation, violates the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. "' The Court appears increasingly ready
to take judicial notice of factors such as the joint financial contribu-
tion of both parents in an increasing number of families-factors
which make the imposition of a double standard in child support
both illogical and self-defeating. This development is evident more
from the results of cases such as Reed, Frontiero, and Wiesenfeld
than from explicit expression by the Court. The language employed
by the Court is often reminiscent of the "traditionally toothless
minimal scrutiny standard" of equal protection. "9 The justices,
however, seem willing to venture into unaccustomed areas6 o and to
exercise less deference to legislative "experimentation."'' The new-
1971); People v. Ellis, 311 N.E.2d 98 (111. 1974).
157. However, dicta in Stanton may qualify such optimism. Although the Court held the
gender-based distinction unconstitutional, it stated that "lilt may be true, as the Utah court
observed and as is argued here, that it is the man's primary responsibility to provide a home
.. " 421 U.S. at 14.
158. 46 U.S.L.W. 3733 (U.S. May 30, 1978) (No. 77-1119). The Alabama Supreme Court
had quashed, as improvidently granted, a petition for certiorari to review a court of civil
appeals decision upholding the statute. Orr v. Orr, 351 So. 2d 906 (Ala. 1977). Justice Richard
L. Jones dissented from the decision to quash and found the statute unconstitutional even
under the rational basis test. Id. at 906. Interestingly, because of a prior determination by
the Alabama Supreme Court that the statute provides no alimony for males, Justice Jones
felt that the statute could not now be interpreted otherwise:
Several Courts have read their alimony statutes so as to include males .... I
cannot accept this reasoning, however. This Court has previously determined that
our statute provides no alimony for male spouses .... Furthermore, because there
was no alimony at common law, our statute must be strictly construed. The power
to award alimony is jealously limited to statutory authority .... For this reason, I
would hold the alimony statutes unconstitutional but I would not rewrite them so
as to include the male spouse. We must look to the legislature to pass a more
appropriate statute.
Id. at 909 (citations omitted). Prior interpretations need not so bind a court when the neces-
sary result would be to preclude what Justice Jones himself found to be a warranted award
of alimony to a "needy wife." Id. at 907. Statutes, like constitutions, must draw "meaning
from the evolving standards... that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
The ultimate resolution of Orr by the United States Supreme Court will probably be
predictive of the manner in which the Court would resolve a challenge to a gender-based child
support statute.
159. Gunther, supra note 77, at 18-19.
160. Id. at 30-33.
161. Id. at 20.
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est equal protection standard requires "legislative purposes that
have substantial basis in actuality, not merely in conjecture."', 2
Child support statutes which place an unequal burden on one
parent do not have a substantial basis in reality. It is clearly conjec-
ture for a legislature to make a factual determination, without bene-
fit of in-court evidence of financial resources, as to which parent in
a particular case is able to contribute to the support of the child.
The final determination, however, should not await an appeal to
the United States Supreme Court. The courts that deal with child
support on a regular basis are state courts. Change, therefore, can
and should emanate from them. Some state constitutions contain
equal protection clauses'13 or their equivalent 4 that can be em-
ployed instead of or in addition to the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution in challenging unequal support laws.
Furthermore, as more legislators recognize the changing meaning of
equal protection and reform existing child support statutes, courts
should be less likely to ignore this mandate. Statutes and judicial
decisions which perpetuate the double standard demonstrate a dis-
regard of the need for long-overdue change.
II. POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
The equal rights amendment to the United States Constitution
would be the most effective and expeditious means of abolishing the
gender-based double standard in all areas of the law, including child
support.65 It has been suggested that the amendment would make
162. Id. at 21.
163. E.g., HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 4; ME. CONST. art. I, § 6-A; MicH. CONST. art. I, § 2;
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
164. E.g., ALAsKA CONST. art. I, § 1; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 3; FuA. CONST. art. I, § 2; Mo.
CONST. art. I, § 2; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 5; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. I, §§ 7,
24.
165. See WOMEN'S RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 156. The proposed 27th amendment to the
United States Constitution provides:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratifica-
tion.
H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as ERA].
At the end of 1975, 34 states had ratified the ERA. Ms., March 1976, at 94. In January,
1977, Indiana became the 35th state to ratify. Final ratification of the amendment requires
ratification by three-fourths, or 38, of the states. U.S. CONST. art. V. Final ratification origi-
nally had to occur by March 22, 1979. Fasteau & Fasteau, May a State Legislature Rescind
Its Ratification of a Pending ConstitutionalAmendment?, 1 H~av. WOMEN'S L.J. 27, 30 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as May a State Legislature Rescind]. However, on August 15, 1978, the
U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R.J. Res. 638, to extend the period allowed for
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sex a prohibited basis of statutory classification."' It is more proba-
ble, however, that under the ERA state and federal governmental
classifications based on sex"7 would not be prohibited per se but
would become suspect.8 8 Thus, they would be scrutinized in a fash-
ion similar to those based on race." 9
Proponents of the amendment claim that statutes affording bene-
fits on the basis of sex would be held to apply to men and women
equally, 70 and statutes which prohibit or limit conduct on the basis
of sex would be invalidated. 7' In the specific area of child support,
proponents claim that, rather than eliminating child support
awards in favor of women, the amendment would allow for their
continued use on a basis of "sexual equality [that] ensures that the
parent who keeps the children will not be in worse financial position
than the other parent."'72 Instead of apportioning child support on
the basis of sex, courts could weigh more appropriate factors: the
relative assets of each parent, the earnings and income capacities
ratification to July 1, 1982. 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. Rac. H8,665 (daily ed. Aug. 15,
1978). The Senate version of the ratification extension legislation, S.J. Res. 134, passed on
October 6, 1978. 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 142 CONG. REc. S17,318 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978). There
was some effort to include within the extension legislation a provision allowing states to
rescind their earlier ratifications. See 124 CONG. Rc. H8,639-58 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1978). The
effort failed. Id. at H6,658. This failure notwithstanding, three states-Idaho, Nebraska, and
Tennessee-have voted to rescind their ratifications. May a State Legislature Rescind, supra
at 30. There is doubt, however, that rescission is legally effective. Similar attempts at rescis-
sion were ignored by Congress when the fourteenth amendment was adopted.
New Jersey and Ohio [sought to withdraw ratification ofi the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and New York ratified and then withdrew its ratification of the Fifteenth
Amendment. Congress at that time evidently concluded that ratification, once
accomplished, could not be undone. New Jersey and Ohio were counted to consti-
tute the requisite three fourths for promulgation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
New York was counted among the states that ratified the Fifteenth Amendment.
Ginsburg, The Need for the Equal Rights Amendment, 59 A.B.A.J. 1013, 1019 (1973).
166. Gabler, supra note 73, at 53; Note, The Impact of the Equal Rights Amendment on
the New York State Alimony Statute, 24 BuFALo L. Rxv. 395, 396 (1975); see Dybwad,
Implementing Washington's ERA: Problems with Wholesale Legislative Revision, 49 WASH.
L. REv. 571, 573-74 (1974).
167. See Ginsburg, The Equal Rights Amendment Is the Way, 1 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19,
21 (1978) [hereinafter cited as The Way].
168. Three Approaches, supra note 81, at 331. Another author expressed the view that
"the ERA will foreclose the necessity for further attempts to have sex declared a 'suspect'
classification, and will instead serve as a basis for legislative alteration of sex discrimination
laws, a stimulus to equality between the sexes, and a foundation for change in legal structures
and attitudes." The Impact of the Equal Rights Amendment on the New York State Alimony
Statute, supra note 166, at 397.
169. See text accompanying notes 81-82 supra.
170. See Ginsburg, supra note 165, at 1017.
171. See The Way, supra note 167, at 21.
172. L. CALLOW, E.R.A., EQUAL RIGHTS OR ETERNAL RUINATION 4 (1975) (pamphlet pub-
lished by the North West-Wayne, Michigan Chapter, NOW).
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of each parent, and the time and care contribution of each parent. 7 '
The most immediate impact of ERA would be the need for legisla-
tive reform of gender-based statutes.'74 One commentator has pro-
posed a three-pronged test by which legislators could judge existing
legislation to determine whether the ERA requires its change:'75
"1) Does a particular law make a distinction between men and
women? 2) Is the distinction permissible?"' 3) If not, should the
statute be invalidated or extended to apply to both sexes
equally?""'
It is highly unlikely that a statute placing an unequal burden of
child support on one parent could survive legislative (or judicial)
analysis under such a test. The following is an example of the analy-
sis which might be used and the change which would result.
The Michigan desertion and nonsupport statute presently in force
penalizes only males:
Any man who deserts and abandons his wife or deserts and aban-
dons his minor children under 17 years of age, without providing
necessary and proper shelter, food, care and clothing for them and
any man who being of sufficient ability shall fail, neglect or refuse
to provide necessary and proper shelter, food, care and clothing for
his wife or his minor children under the age of 17 years, shall be
guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison
for not more than 3 years, nor less than 1 year, or by imprisonment
in the county jail for not more than 1 year, and not less than 3
months .... "7I
173. Brown, supra note 75, at 946.
174. See K. DAVIDSON, R. GINSBERG, & H. KAY, TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEX-BA SED
DISCRIMINATION 115 (1974) (indicating that several studies have found that hundreds of state
statutes contain gender-based references which will require legislative review under ERA).
See also Ginsburg, supra note 165, at 1019.
175. Gabler, supra note 73, at 54.
176. The ERA does not require that women be treated in all respects the same
as men. Equality does not mean "sameness." . .. [Tihe ERA will not preclude
legislation dealing with physical characteristics unique to one sex. Examples would
include a law permitting maternal leave for childbearing for females, or a law
regulating the donation of sperm for males only. Thus, the unique physical charac-
teristics exception is limited to physical characteristics and does not extend to
psychological, social or other characteristics. In contrast, if a particular characteris-
tic is found among members of both sexes, then under the ERA it is not the sex
factor but the individual factor which is determinative.
Id. at 53-54.
177. Id. at 55-56.
178. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.161 (1948). Interestingly, the former version of this
statute employed the word "person" instead of "man." Pub. Act No. 328, § 161, 1931 Mich.
Pub. Acts 624. The statute was amended in 1947 to its present form. Pub. Act No. 142, § 1,
1947 Mich. Pub. Acts 193.
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Under the first question posed to the legislature in the three-
pronged test, the statute explicitly does distinguish between men
and women by its singular reference to men as subject to prosecu-
tion for nonsupport. Furthermore, an opinion of the Michigan attor-
ney general clearly holds the statute applicable only to men. 7,
Under the second prong of the test, the distinction is clearly im-
permissible under the ERA. The state interest in enacting support
legislation is the assurance of support for minor children.'u A
gender-based distinction between parents does not promote that
interest under any standard of review-whether sex be a prohibited
or merely a suspect classification.
The affirmative answers to the first two questions posed in the
test would necessitate a legislative reevaluation under the third
question. The result of this reevaluation undoubtedly would lead to
a statutory amendment extending coverage of the statute to both
parents. The substitution of the word "parent" where "man" pres-
ently appears and the addition of the words "or her" where "his"
presently appears would accomplish this result.' The alterna-
tive-invalidation of the statute-would defeat the valid state inter-
est in enacting a child support statute: to assure support for minor
children by punishing nonsupport.
Regardless of the test employed, however, reform would be wide-
spread if the ERA were ratified. Washington adopted an equal
179. In [1945-461 MICH. Op. Arr'y GEN. 0-4331, the attorney general advised that the
statute did not apply to a woman who abandoned her children while her husband was away
in the armed forces. However, prosecution was seen as possible under another, gender-neutral
statute, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.136 (1948):
Any parent or guardian or person under whose protection any child may be, who
cruelly or unlawfully punishes, or wilfully, unlawfully or negligently deprives of
necessary food, clothing or shelter, or who wilfully abandons a child under 16 years
of age, or who habitually causes or permits the health of such child to be injured,
his or her life endangered by exposure, want or other injury to his or her person, or
causes or permits him or her to engage in any occupation that will be likely to
endanger his or her health, or deprave his or her morals or who habitually permits
him or her to frequent public places for the purpose of begging or receiving alms,
or to frequent the company of or consort with reputed thieves or prostitutes, or by
vicious training depraves the morals of such child, shall, upon conviction, be
deemed guilty of a felony ....
The existence of this statute would not, however, be sufficient to preclude a finding of unequal
treatment between the sexes because it is not a nonsupport statute but a cruelty to children
statute and therefore has a more limited scope of application.
180. Some statutes, like the Michigan one discussed, are designed to protect wives as well.
181. There should be no inference that "his" includes "her," for the Michigan Legislature
has used both pronouns where it intended both sexes to be included. See MIC. ComP. LAws
ANN. § 750.136 (1948), quoted in note 179 supra. In addition, to fully comply with the ERA,
this Michigan statute would have to be amended to substitute the word "spouse" where
"wife" presently appears. See note 180 supra.
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rights amendment to its constitution in 1972.182 The statute imple-
menting the amendment amended 120 separate sections of the Re-
vised Code of Washington and repealed four others. Moreover:
By far the greatest number of the revised statutes touch upon the
marital or family relationship .... These changes seek to equalize
treatment of spouses by extending to the wife many rights formerly
available only to the husband, as well as extending to husbands
some benefits previously reserved only to wives. The wife is also
now subject to several duties formerly imposed only on the hus-
band.Ia3
The purpose of the two-year delay built into the ERA"" is to give
state legislatures and Congress" sufficient time to conform laws to
a standard of sexual equality.'
Providing for equal rights between the sexes in state constitutions
is an alternative basis, though jurisdictionally more limited, upon
which to equalize the child support duty.5 7 Fifteen states currently
have such constitutional provisions."" Not surprisingly, most of
these states are presently among those whose statutes place an
equal duty of support on both parents.' So the constitutional provi-
sions, as they affect child support, have been subjected to only
limited judicial interpretation. The few cases that have been re-
ported, however, are both encouraging in their results and predic-
tive of the potential interpretation of a federal ERA.
182. WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, discussed in Dybwad, supra note 166.
183. Dybwad, supra note 166, at 571.
184. See ERA § 3, quoted in note 165 supra.
185. See Ginsburg, supra note 165, at 1014. The author notes that, according to the
solicitor general, a recent computer search revealed 876 sections of the United States Code
with gender-based references.
186. S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1972); see Brown, supra note 75, at 909.
187. For an interesting discussion of a hypothetical court opinion calling for an equal duty
in child support under Illinois' state equal rights amendment and a suggestion of a step-by-
step rationale by which other courts could accomplish this (through declaration of sex as a
suspect classification), see Note, Child Support: His, Her, or Their Responsibility, 25 DE PAUL
L. REV. 707, 719-22 (1976).
188. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 3; COLO. CoNsT. art. II, § 29; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20; HAW.
CONST. art. I, § 4; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 18; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 46; MoNT.
CONST. art. II, § 4; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 2; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18; PA. CONsT. art. I, §
28; Tax. CONST. art. I, § 3a; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 1; VA. CONST. art. I, § 11; WASH. CONsT.
art. XXXI; Wyo. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-3; id. art. VI, § 1.
189. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.210 (1962); COLO. Rav. STAT. § 14-10-115 (1973); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46-57 (West Supp. 1978); HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-47 (Supp. 1977); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 40, § 19 (1975); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 43-323 (Supp. 1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
458:17 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-7-6 to 15 (Supp. 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (1953);
VA. CODE § 20-107 (Supp. 1977); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.09.100 (Supp. 1977); Wvo. STAT.
ANN. § 20-2-113 (1977).
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In 1974, in People v. Elliott,"10 the Colorado Supreme Court re-
versed a ruling that a statute imposing criminal sanctions for non-
support solely on the father was violative of the Colorado Constitu-
tion's equal rights amendment."' The court reasoned that the crimi-
nal conduct in question occurred prior to the effective date of the
amendment and that the amendment should be given only prospec-
tive application."' The court did not deny, however, that the
amendment would invalidate such a statute if enforcement were
sought after its effective date.
In another 1974 case, Conway v. Dana,"3 the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court dealt directly with the constitutionality, under the
state's equal rights amendment, 9 ' of the common law presumption
that the child support obligation should rest on the father. Warren
Dana petitioned for a reduction in a child support order on the
grounds that his income had markedly declined and his former wife
had obtained employment. The trial court denied his petition. The
Superior Court affirmed. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the longstanding presumption of the father's pri-
mary liability for support, based solely on sex, was no longer valid
because of the recently passed equal rights amendment to the
state's constitution. Assuming that the trial court had adhered to
that presumption and thus had disregarded the mother's income in
denying the modification, the court reversed and ordered the modi-
fication. "15
In dealing with the related area of child custody,"' however, a
Maryland court reached a contrary result,"7 holding that the prefer-
ence for mothers in child custody cases survived the passage of that
190. 525 P.2d 457 (Colo. 1974).
191. COLO. CONST. art. H, § 29. The statute upon which this prosecution was based was
amended to impose equal susceptibility to prosecution for nonsupport on both parents. The
father's criminal conduct, however, occurred prior to the amendment. See note 134 supra.
192. 525 P.2d at 458-59.
193. 318 A.2d 324 (Pa. 1974), discussed in 10 TULSA L.J. 485 (1975).
194. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
195. "Combining the decrease in the father's income along with the additional income
resulting from the mother's recently acquired employment provides a sufficient change in
circumstances to warrant a modification of the original order." 318 A.2d at 326-27.
196. Fathers are frequently victims of unwarranted presumptions about their childrearing
ability. In a relatively recent decision, the Utah Supreme Court brushed aside a father's equal
protection argument with the statement: "The contention [that a statutory presumption in
favor of the mother violated equal protection] might have some merit to it in a proper case
if the father was equally as gifted in lactation as is the mother." Arends v. Arends, 517 P.2d
1019, 1020 (Utah), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974). The subject of this custody battle was a
four-year-old child. See Conlin, Equal Protection Versus Equal Rights Amendment-Where
Are We Now?, 24 DRAKE L. REv. 259, 289-92 (1975).
197. Cooke v. Cooke, 319 A.2d 841 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974).
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state's equal rights amendment.' Immediately after this decision,
the legislature amended the custody statute to prohibit a preference
based on sex in favor of either parent.'" This legislative action re-
moved from the discretion of the trial court the power to stereotype
individuals on the basis of sex in deciding questions of child cus-
tody.
Expanded equality through state constitutional amendments
would require the adoption of such provisions by many more states,
an objective not presently sought by ERA advocates. 20 Final ratifi-
cation of the federal ERA, therefore, is especially desirable. It not
only would encourage legislative reform in every jurisdiction20' with-
out resort to the judicial process202 but also, by making sex a suspect
classification, would provide a more certain basis upon which to
challenge statutes or judicial decisions which perpetuated a gender-
based double standard.23 Additionally, ratification would expedite
a reevaluation of outmoded presumptions by society generally and
by the judiciary specifically. Surely it would encourage-if not com-
pel-fair decisions based on realistic evaluations of the capabilities
of each parent.201
IV. CONCLUSION
Child support laws have been enacted in every state to protect
minor children. Unfortunately, however, those laws generally have
been enforced in an ineffective205 and discriminatory manner. State
198. MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 46.
199. MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (Supp. 1977).
200. ERAmerica is the primary organization coordinating the fight for the ERA. In a
discussion with Laura Callow, cochairwoman of Michigan ERAmerica, she stated that all
efforts at this time are being put forth for ratification of the federal ERA rather than state
amendments. For more information, contact ERAmerica, 1525 M Street, N.W., Ste. 605,
Washington, D.C. 20036.
201. See sources cited note 166 supra and text accompanying note 166.
202. It is the legislatures that will play the key role in implementing ERA, while courts
will play an important but secondary role. Gabler, supra note 73, at 55; see text accompanying
notes 173, 177-86 supra.
203. See HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, MINoRrrY REPORT ON THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMEND-
MENT, H.R. REp. No. 359, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-8 (1971). See generally Ex Parte Virginia,
100 U.S. 339 (1880); I.C. ANTiEAU, MODERN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw § 8:4, at 566 (1969) ("Ac-
tion by state and local courts and judges will generally be state action. ... ).
204. The ERA would not mean that a father could not be charged with the full financial
burden of child support. Such a result could be fair and equitable if reached after an examina-
tion of the individual circumstances and without resort to gender-based presumptions. For a
case in which it was held under a state equal rights amendment not to be an abuse of
discretion to so charge a father, see Schaab v. Schaab, 531 P.2d 954 (N.M. 1974). See note
206 infra.
205. The following chart reflects the probability of a divorced mother's collecting child
support payments.
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courts and legislatures have perpetuated a double standard without
examining its applicability to today's society. A disservice has been
done both to the fathers, who bear a disproportionate and unrealis-
tic financial burden, and to the mothers, who are neither credited
with the ability to bear financial responsibilities nor challenged to
take on such responsibilities.
Many men and women of today no longer fit into the mold of the
past, a mold which shaped these laws. Present circumstances de-
mand careful analysis of the financial capabilities of an individual
without regard to gender-based assumptions. The most effective
tool with which to force such analysis may be the increasing number
of state statutes which impose the child support duty on both par-
ents. As judges accept the literal meaning of these statutes and look
to reality rather than sexual stereotypes, a fair apportionment of the
support obligation can be accomplished .20
Beyond this, evolving notions of the meaning of equal rights and
of constitutional equal protection provisions, both state and federal,
provide tools by which inequality in child support statutes and judi-
cial decisions may be challenged. Neither state legislators nor
judges can long ignore the present constitutional interpretations of
the rights of each person to stand before the law as an individual
rather than merely as a member of a particular sex. The time for
change is here. The means are available. The law as a dynamic and
responsive tool of society must make such change a reality.
Years Number
Since of Full Partial No Non-paying Fathers
Court Open Corn- Corn- Corn- Against Whom Legal
Order Cases pliance pliance pliance Action Was Taken
One 163 38% 20% 42% 19%
Two 163 28 20 52 32
Three 161 26 14 60 21
Four 161 22 11 67 18
Five 160 19 14 67 9
Six 158 17 12 71 6
Seven 157 17 12 71 4
Eight 155 17 8 75 2
Nine 155 17 8 75 0
Ten 149 13 8 79 1
Nagel & Weitzman, Women as Litigants, 23 HSTINGS L.J. 171, 189-90 (1971) (reporting and
commenting on material compiled by Kenneth Eckhardt in a 1955 study conducted in a
metropolitan Wisconsin county, Eckhardt, Deviance, Visibility, and Legal Action: The Duty
to Support, 15 Soc. PROS. 470 (1968)). See also note 3 supra.
206. A "fair apportionment" does not mean a rigidly enforced 50-50 contribution ratio.
"Several state courts, considering ERA challenges to sex-based child support laws, already
have ruled that mathematically equal contributions are not required by the ERA." WoMEN's
RIGH's, supra note 3, at 156 (citing Friedman v. Friedman, 521 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Ct. App.
1975); Smith v. Smith, 534 P.2d 1033 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975)).
